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INTRODUCTION
A forum selection (“FS”), choice-of-forum, or choice-of-court clause
is an agreement by which the parties submit a dispute to the jurisdiction of
a designated court (the “chosen” court). Before one can properly speak of
such an “agreement,” however, one must first verify that it came into
existence and determine whether it is valid and enforceable. In turn, this
determination may require answering several questions, such as whether
there was a meeting of the minds, whether the parties’ consent was free of
vices, and generally whether the agreement suffers from any defects like
unconscionability or violation of public policy. These questions are
hereinafter referred to as questions of “validity” or “enforceability” of the
FS clause.1
If the FS clause is enforceable, the court may have to answer other
questions regarding the meaning, scope, and effect of the clause. Examples
of such questions are whether the clause encompasses pre-contract or noncontractual—in addition to contractual—claims, whether it binds nonsignatories or other third parties, and whether it confers exclusive or
nonexclusive jurisdiction to the chosen court—sometimes referred to as
“mandatory” or “permissive” clauses, respectively. For example, in
certain countries, a FS clause is presumed to be exclusive unless it
provides otherwise, but no such presumption exists in the United States.2

1. This Article uses the terms “validity” and “enforceability” as synonyms.
Some authors distinguish between the two. See William J. Woodward, Jr.,
Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It Protects from Adhesive
Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 16–21 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee,
Choice of Law Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of International
Forum Selection Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 43, 47–62 (2004). Although this distinction is valid, it is unnecessary for the
purposes of this Article.
2. This circumstance exists, for example, under the Brussels I Regulation,
which is in force in 27 countries of the European Union (“EU”), the parallel
Lugano Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005. See
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters 2012, No. 1215/2012, art. 25(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter Brussels
I]; Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 30/10/2007, art. 23 [hereinafter
Lugano Convention]; Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 30
June 2005, art. 3(b) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. This convention is in force
in the EU, Mexico, and Singapore. The United States has signed but not ratified
it. See 37: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH,
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This Article refers to these questions as questions of interpretation of the
FS clause.3
Some of these questions are legal, and others are factual; but in either
case, and as long as the case has contacts with more than one state—that
is, a “multistate” case—the court must address the logically antecedent
question—under which state’s laws should one answer these questions?
This is the choice-of-law question. This inquiry is necessary because, even
with regard to factual questions, the laws of the involved states may differ,
for example, on what inferences to draw from facts, who should bear the
burden of proof, or how to ascertain the parties’ intent.
Under which law should a court determine the enforceability of a FS
clause and which law should the court use in interpreting the clause?
Should the answer to either question differ depending on whether the court
is the one chosen in the FS clause or one not so chosen (the “seized”
court)? If a party files the action in the chosen court, should the court
directly apply the “internal” law of the forum state—that is, lex fori,
namely its substantive and procedural law exclusive of its conflicts law—
or should the court employ a choice-of-law analysis? If the latter, should
that analysis lead to applying the law that governs the underlying
contract—lex contractus4—which may or may not be the law of the forum
state? If a party files the action in another court, should the court apply the
lex fori, the lex contractus, or the law of the state chosen in the FS clause?
This Article discusses these questions and the struggle of American
courts to come up with the right answers.5 The discussion divides the cases
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last updated
May 2017) [https://perma.cc/KJ8N-SWEE].
3. Logically, a court determines first whether the clause is enforceable and
then, if necessary, undertakes its interpretation. In some cases, however, the court
must interpret the clause—for example, to determine whether it is exclusive or
whether it encompasses the disputed tort claims—before deciding its enforceability.
4. Because of the doctrine of separability or severability of the FS clause from
the rest of the contract, it is possible for the clause and the contract to be governed
by different laws. To keep things relatively simple, this Article does not address this
possibility. For the doctrine of separability, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, OXFORD
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW: CHOICE OF LAW 460–62 (2016).
5. A related issue is whether, in answering these questions, a federal court
sitting in diversity should employ federal or state law standards. This Article does
not discuss this issue. For discussions of this issue, see, for example, Matthew J.
Sorensen, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court after
Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2014); Kelly A. Blair, A Judicial
Solution to the Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement Circuit Split: Giving Erie a
Second Chance, 46 GA. L. REV. 799 (2012); Maxwell J. Wright, Enforcing
Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the Current Disarray of Federal
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into three categories. The first category includes cases in which the action
is filed in the court chosen in the FS clause (“Scenario 1”). The second
category encompasses all cases in which the action is filed in another
court. For purposes of analysis, these cases are divided into two
subcategories: (a) cases in which the FS clause is not accompanied by a
choice-of-law clause (“Scenario 2”); and (b) cases in which the FS clause
is accompanied by a choice-of-law clause, usually contained in the same
contract (“Scenario 3”). The figure below depicts the three scenarios and
the court’s possible choices in each.
FIGURE 1. LAW GOVERNING FS CLAUSES: THE COURT’S CHOICES
Action in another court (“seized”
court)
SCENARIO 1.
Action in
chosen court

Lex
fori

Lex
contractus

SCENARIO 2.
Contract
without a
choice-of-law
clause
Lex
fori

Lex
contractus
Law of
chosen
court

SCENARIO 3.
Contract
with a choiceof-law clause
Lex
fori

Chosen
law

Law of
chosen
court

I. SCENARIO 1: ACTIONS FILED IN THE CHOSEN COURT
Scenario 1 consists of cases in which the action is filed in the court
designated in the FS clause. Because this Article deals with multistate
cases, the choice-of-law question is present even in Scenario 1 cases. For
example, the Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005, which is the
most authoritative and recent instrument on this issue, provides that if the
action is filed in the chosen court, the court “shall have jurisdiction,”
Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal for Judicial Reform, 44
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625 (2011); Ryan T. Holt, A Uniform System for the
Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1913 (2009).
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unless the FS clause is “null and void” under the law—including the
conflicts law—of the state of the chosen court.6 The European Union’s
Brussels I Regulation, which applies in 27 EU states, also follows the same
path.7 Thus, these systems require the chosen court to undertake a choiceof-law analysis for selecting the state whose law will determine whether
the FS clause is “null and void,” and that analysis may or may not lead to
the law of the forum state.
By contrast, as the following discussion illustrates, the American
practice is to bypass the choice-of-law inquiry and directly apply the
internal law of the forum state, which in this scenario is the state chosen
in the FS clause.8 Affirmative evidence to this effect is found in state
statutes dealing with “inbound” FS clauses, namely clauses choosing a
court in the enacting state. For example, a New Hampshire statute provides
in part:
If the parties have agreed in writing that an action on a controversy
may be brought in this state and the agreement provides the only
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, a court of this state will
entertain the action if:
(a) the court has power under the law of this state to entertain the
action;
(b) this state is a reasonably convenient place for the trial of the
action;
(c) the agreement as to the place of the action was not obtained by
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other
unconscionable means; . . . .9

6. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 5 (providing that the chosen court
“shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless
the agreement is null and void under the law of [the chosen] State”); see also
Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report, Convention of 30 June
2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, ¶ 125 (2013), http://www.hcch.net
/upload/expl37final.pdf [https://perma.cc/93V7-GMW4]. The accompanying
Explanatory Report clarifies that the reference to the law of the chosen state
“includes the choice-of-law rules of that State.” Hartley & Dogauchi, supra.
7. See Brussels I, supra note 2, art. 25 (“[The chosen] court . . . shall have
jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity
under the law of [the chosen] State.”). Recital 20 clarifies that the law of the
chosen state includes its choice-of-law rules. Id.
8. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
9. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508-A:2(I) (2018). Other states, such as
Nebraska and North Dakota, have identical statutes. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25414 (2018); N.D. CENT. STAT. § 28-04.1-02 (2018).
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According to this statute, a New Hampshire court must enforce an inbound
FS clause unless the clause fails to meet the requirements listed in
subsections (a)–(c). Nothing in the wording of these subsections suggests
that the court should consider any law other than its own.
To be sure, the above statute, as well as similar statutes in other states,
addresses only the enforceability and not the interpretation of inbound FS
clauses.10 The statutes do not prevent a choice-of-law inquiry for a clause
that is enforceable under these statutes but presents questions of
interpretation, such as whether the clause is mandatory or permissive. It is
conceivable that a court may undertake such an inquiry regarding those
questions.
Several other states, including Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New York,
and Texas have enacted statutes designed to attract certain high-value
contracts to their markets and any resulting litigation to their courts. These
statutes provide that if these contracts contain both choice-of-law and FS
clauses choosing the laws and courts of those states, both clauses will be
enforceable virtually without any scrutiny and certainly without a choiceof-law inquiry.11 For example, a California statute provides,
Any person may maintain an action . . . in a court of this state
against a . . . nonresident person where the action . . . arises out of
or relates to any contract . . . for which a choice of California law
has been made . . . by the parties thereto and which
(a) is a contract . . . relating to a transaction involving . . . not less
than one million dollars ($1,000,000), and
(b) contains a provision . . . under which the . . . nonresident agrees
to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.12
Even in the absence of statutes like the above, courts tend to bypass the
choice-of-law inquiry in Scenario 1 cases. A review of cases in which the
action was filed in a court chosen in the FS clause has not revealed any
instances in which the court undertook a choice-of-law inquiry in

10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2708, 12A-117 (2018); FLA. STAT.
§§ 685.101–.102 (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/5-5, 5-10 (2018); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1401 to -1402 (McKinney 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 15.020 (West 2018).
11. See supra note 10.
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.40 (West 2018). For a case misinterpreting
this statute, see Summit Diamond Bridge Lenders, L.L.C. v. Philip R. Seaver Title
Co., No. 326679, 2016 WL 7427500 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
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determining the enforceability of the clause.13 For example, in 2017, nine
appellate cases involved this scenario, and the courts applied the law of
the forum without a choice-of-law analysis in each case.14 Indeed, the
chances of such an undertaking are slim. If the contract contains a choiceof-law clause in addition to the FS clause, the two clauses are likely to
point to the same state, that is, the forum state.15 If the contract does not

13. Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2007), a case
presenting a somewhat similar scenario, is distinguishable on other grounds. A
contract between Abbott, an Illinois company, and Takeda, a Japanese company,
contained an Illinois choice-of-law clause and a floating FS clause. The latter
clause required any lawsuit between the parties to be brought in Japan if Abbott
were the plaintiff and in Illinois if Takeda were the plaintiff. Instead, Abbott sued
Takeda in Illinois. In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the lawsuit under the Japanese prong of the FS clause. Among the
disputed issues were an issue of interpretation of the clause—whether it
encompassed tort claims—and one of enforceability—whether the clause was
“unreasonable” in mandating litigation in Japan. The court decided both issues
under Illinois law, holding for Takeda. However, because Illinois was both the
forum state and the state whose law was chosen in the choice-of-law clause, this
case does not support the proposition that the law of the forum qua forum governs
FS clauses. Id.
14. Five of these cases involved only questions of enforceability. See Lubinski
v. Hub Grp. Trucking, Inc., 690 Fed. App’x 377 (6th Cir. 2017); Corp. Creations
Enter., L.L.C. v. Brian R. Fons Attorney at Law P.C., 225 So. 3d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017); Stone Surgical, L.L.C. v. Stryker Corp., 858 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2017),
reh’g en banc denied (July 12, 2017), cert. filed, No. 17–556 (Oct. 10, 2017); Rocky
Mountain Builders Supply, Inc. v. Marks, 392 P.3d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 2017);
Deffenbaugh v. Giancola, 2017 WL 281019 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2017). Three
cases involved only questions of interpretation. See 1st Source Bank v. Neto, 861
F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2017); Cent. Petroleum, Ltd. v. Geoscience Res. Recovery,
L.L.C., 2017 WL 6374694 (Tex. App. Dec. 14, 2017); Am. Finasco, Inc. v. Thrash,
2017 WL 391377 (Tex. App. Jan. 26, 2017). One case, Autoridad de Energia
Electrica de Puerto Rico v. Vitol S.A., 859 F.3d 140 (1st Cir. 2017), involved both
questions.
15. With the possible exception of “floating” FS clauses, cases in which the
FS and choice-of-law clauses pointed to two different states are rare. This author
is aware of only three such cases: Rucker v. Oasis Legal Fin., L.L.C., 632 F.3d
1231 (11th Cir. 2011) (contract containing Illinois FS and Alabama choice-of-law
clauses); Intermetals Corp. v. Hanover Int’l AG fur Industrieversicherungen, 188
F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (D.N.J. 2001) (contract containing Austrian FS clause and
English choice-of-law clause); and Avanesians v. Coll. Network, Inc., 2016 WL
3570424 (Cal. App. June 23, 2016) (Indiana FS clause accompanied by a choiceof-law clause pointing to the consumers’ home states). For floating FS clauses,
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contain a choice-of-law clause, the court likely will assume that the FS
clause amounts to an implicit choice-of-law clause. By agreeing to litigate
in the chosen state, the parties also have impliedly agreed to the application
of that state’s law.16 Even if the court does not subscribe to this
assumption, the court will have no incentive to apply the law of another
state in determining whether it should hear a case that the parties agreed
should be heard by that court.
II. ACTIONS FILED IN A COURT NOT CHOSEN—THE “SEIZED” FORUM
Cases in which the action is filed in a forum other than the one
designated in the FS clause are more numerous and more difficult. They
also are more likely to attract a choice-of-law inquiry. These cases can be
divided into two categories: (a) cases in which the contract does not
contain a choice-of-law clause (“Scenario 2”); and (b) cases in which the
contract contains a choice-of-law clause in addition to the FS clause
(“Scenario 3”). The discussion below begins with cases of the first
category.
A. Scenario 2: Contracts Without a Choice-of-Law Clause
In Scenario 2 cases, the court has two options, which may lead to three
different laws: (1) apply the internal law of the seized forum, the lex fori,
without a choice-of-law analysis; or (2) employ a choice-of-law analysis,
which may lead (a) back to the lex fori; (b) to the law of the state whose
courts are chosen in the FS clause; or (c) to the law that governs the
underlying contract—lex contractus.
The Hague Choice of Court Convention requires a choice-of-law
inquiry for most issues. Article 6 of the Convention provides that if the
action is filed in a court other than the one chosen in the FS agreement,
that court, the seized court, must suspend or dismiss the proceeding, unless
(a) the agreement is null and void under the [law applicable under
see Paul H. Cross, “Floating” Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses, 48
S. TEX. L. REV. 125 (2006).
16. A FS clause alone does not amount to a choice-of-law clause; together
with additional contacts, even if slim, it may amount to an implied choice of the
law of the state designated in the FS clause. Cf. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 13 n.15 (1972) (“[W]hile the contract here did not specifically provide
that the substantive law of England should be applied, it is the general rule in
English courts that the parties are assumed, absent contrary indication, to have
designated the forum with the view that it should apply its own law.”).
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the conflicts] law of the State of the chosen court;
(b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under
the [law applicable under the conflicts] law of the State of the
court seised; [or]
(c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of
the State of the court seised.17
The bracketed words come from the Explanatory Report, which states that
the reference to the “law” of the state of either the chosen court or the
seized court “includes the choice-of-law rules of that State.”18 Thus, the
only issues for which the seized court does not need to undertake a choiceof-law inquiry are whether enforcement of the agreement would lead to
“manifest injustice” or would be contrary to the “public policy,” both of
which are by definition domestic law concepts.19 For all other issues, the
seized court must undertake a choice-of-law analysis, and for some of
those issues, it must employ the choice-of-law rules of another state—the
chosen state—with all the concomitant renvoi complications.20 This rather
complex scheme is likely to produce great uncertainty.
By contrast, in the United States, courts, as well as legislatures, tend
to avoid the choice-of-law inquiry—at least with regard to the
enforceability of the FS clause.21 Several state statutes dealing with
outbound FS clauses, namely clauses choosing a court outside the enacting
state, reflect this position. These statutes fall into two categories. The first
category encompasses general statutes that regulate the enforceability, but
not the interpretation, of all outbound clauses that meet certain specified
requirements. An example from this category is the following Nebraska
statute, which provides in part as follows:
If the parties have agreed in writing that an action . . . shall be
brought only in another state and it is brought in a court of this state,
the court will dismiss or stay the action, as appropriate, unless . . .

17. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 6.
18. See Hartley & Dogauchi, supra note 6, ¶¶ 125, 149, 183–84.
19. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 78–82.
20. Renvoi is the application of the choice-of-law rules of the state whose law
is designated as applicable by the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. For an
in-depth discussion of renvoi and the possible complications, see SYMEONIDES,
supra note 4, at 73–78.
21. For example, in 2017, nine appellate cases involved this scenario, and in
all of them the courts applied the law of the forum qua forum. For citations, see
infra notes 44–46.
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(2) the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state, for
reasons other than delay in bringing the action;
(3) the other state would be a substantially less convenient place
for the trial of the action than this state;
(4) the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained by
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other
unconscionable means; or
(5) it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to
enforce the agreement.22
The above requirements are more stringent than the requirements for
enforcing inbound clauses, but they are similar in that both are phrased in
terms of domestic law or perhaps general common law, without any
reference to choice-of-law factors. For example, the statute does not require
the court to apply foreign law of misrepresentation or unconscionability, and
the court is unlikely to do so on its own. As alluded to earlier, these statutes
address only the enforceability and not the interpretation of inbound FS
clauses.23 Thus, for clauses that are enforceable under these statutes but that
also present questions of interpretation, a court is free to undertake a choiceof-law analysis to determine the law under which to answer those questions.
The second category encompasses statutes that prohibit enforcement of
outbound FS clauses in certain types of contracts that have contacts with the
enacting state.24 For example, a Tennessee statute provides,
Any provision in any agreement . . . restricting jurisdiction or
venue to a forum outside this state or requiring the application of
the laws of another state with respect to any claim arising under
or relating to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act . . . is void
as a matter of public policy.25
Similarly, an Ohio statute provides that “[a]ny provision of a construction
contract . . . for improvement . . . to real estate in this state that requires
any litigation, arbitration, or other dispute resolution process . . . to occur
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-415 (2018). For identical statutes, see N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 508-A:3 (2018); N.D. CENT. STAT. § 28-04.1-03 (2018).
23. See supra note 9.
24. For a statute that seems to apply to all contracts, see S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-7-120(A) (2018) (“Notwithstanding a provision in a contract requiring a cause
of action arising under it to be brought in a location other than as provided in this
title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for a similar cause of action,
the cause of action alternatively may be brought in the manner provided in this
title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for such causes of action.”).
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-113(b) (2018).
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in another state is void and unenforceable as against public policy.”26
Other statutes contain similar prohibitions in consumer contracts,27
employment contracts,28 agency contracts,29 franchise contracts,30 and
construction contracts.31 The common denominator among these statutes

26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62(D)(2) (LexisNexis 2018).
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided
in this section, any provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that
requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises
from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public policy
and is void and unenforceable. This prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer
loan transactions or to any action or arbitration of a dispute that is commenced in
another state pursuant to a forum selection provision with the consent of all parties
to the contract at the time that the dispute arises.”); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 12A-117(a)
(2018) (“The parties to an electronic contract may choose an exclusive judicial
forum; provided, however, that . . . if the contract is a consumer contract the choice
is not enforceable if such choice is unreasonable and unjust.”).
28. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2) (2018) (“The provisions
of every employment contract . . . by which any . . . employer . . . includes a choice
of forum clause or choice of law clause . . . shall be null and void except where
the choice of forum clause or choice of law clause is expressly, knowingly, and
voluntarily agreed to and ratified by the employee after the occurrence of the
incident which is the subject of the civil or administrative action.”).
29. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 1335.11(F) (“Any provision in any contract
between a sales representative and principal is void if it purports to do any of the
following: (1) waive any of the provisions of this section; (2) make the contract
subject to the laws of another state; (3) limit the right of the sales representative
to initiate litigation or alternative dispute resolution in this state.”).
30. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 523H.3.1 (2018) (“A provision in a franchise
agreement restricting jurisdiction to a forum outside this state is void with respect
to a claim otherwise enforceable under this chapter.”).
31. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-2 (“A provision in any contract . . . for
the improvement of real property in this State . . . is void and against public policy
if it makes the contract . . . subject to the laws of another state, or provides that the
exclusive forum for any litigation, arbitration, or other dispute resolution process is
located in another state.”); WIS. STAT. § 779.135 (2018) (“The following provisions
in contracts for the improvement of land in this state are void: . . . (2) Provisions
making the contract subject to the laws of another state or requiring that any
litigation, arbitration or other dispute resolution process on the contract occur in
another state.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-3(2) (2018) (“A provision in a construction
agreement requiring a dispute arising under the agreement to be resolved in a forum
outside of this state is void and unenforceable as against the public policy of this state
if: (a) one of the parties to the agreement is domiciled in this state; and (b) work to be
done and the equipment and materials to be supplied under the agreement involves a
construction project in this state.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2779.A (“The legislature

1130

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

is that they preempt a judicial choice-of-law analysis. They provide that
outbound FS clauses that fall within the scope of these statutes are against
the forum’s public policy and thus are unenforceable, regardless of any
contacts with other states and, in many cases, even if the contract also
contains an outbound choice-of-law clause.32
Even in the absence of statutes like the ones described above,
American courts are reluctant to undertake a choice-of-law inquiry when
considering the enforceability of outbound FS clauses in Scenario 2 cases.
The following quotations are the conclusions of two authors who have
studied this question in depth—Professors Kevin M. Clermont and Jason
W. Yackee. Clermont concludes that “[a]lmost all American courts apply
their own law, the lex fori,” and “[m]ost do so with little or no thinking.”33
Yackee, who sharply criticizes “[t]his bias towards the lex fori,”34
acknowledges that “with rare exceptions, United States courts tend not to
engage in explicit choice of law analysis” and instead “reflexively apply
lex fori, even when the contract contains an explicit choice of law clause
selecting the laws of another jurisdiction to govern the contract as a
whole.”35

finds that with respect to construction contracts . . . when one of the parties is
domiciled in Louisiana, and the work to be done . . . involve construction projects in
this state, provisions in such agreements requiring disputes arising thereunder to be
resolved in a forum outside of this state or requiring their interpretation to be
governed by the laws of another jurisdiction are inequitable and against the public
policy of this state.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.42(a) (2018) (“The following
provisions of a contract between the contractor and a subcontractor with principal
offices in this state, for the construction of a public or private work of improvement
in this state, shall be void and unenforceable: (1) A provision which purports to
require any dispute between the parties to be litigated, arbitrated, or otherwise
determined outside this state.”); FLA. STAT. § 47.025 (2018) (“Any venue provision
in a contract for improvement to real property which requires legal action involving
a resident contractor, subcontractor, sub-subcontractor, or materialman . . . to be
brought outside this state is void as a matter of public policy.”).
32. By prohibiting enforcement of these clauses, these statutes generally
render moot any issues of interpretation because, ordinarily, those questions arise
only for enforceable clauses. Sometimes, however, a court must first interpret the
clause to determine, for example, whether it encompasses certain claims or
reaches certain parties and then decide whether it is enforceable.
33. Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 643, 649 (2015) (footnote omitted).
34. Yackee, supra note 1, at 69.
35. Id. at 67. The “rare exceptions” to which the author alludes are cases in
which the contract did contain a choice-of-law clause. Id.
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An example of this trend is Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc.,36
which involved a contract between an Italian manufacturer and an
American distributor. The contract designated Florence, Italy, as the forum
for resolution of any controversy “regarding interpretation or fulfillment”
of the contract.37 The question was one of interpretation—whether the
clause encompassed tort claims in addition to contract claims.38 The court
answered the question in the affirmative without any consideration of or
reference to Italian law.39
Another example is Boland v. George S. May Intern. Co.,40 in which
the question also was one of interpretation—whether a clause providing
that “jurisdiction shall vest in the State of Illinois” was mandatory or
permissive.41 To the disappointment of the clause’s drafter, the
Massachusetts court held that this clause only “permitted, but did not
require, the litigation to be brought in the State of Illinois.”42 The court did
not make any reference to Illinois law.43
Indeed, more often than not, courts tend to apply forum law reflexively
without considering any other alternatives. For example, in 2017, nine
appellate cases involved this scenario, and in all of them, the courts applied
the law of the forum. Five of these cases involved only questions of

36. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988).
37. Id. at 510.
38. Id. at 513–14.
39. Id.
40. Boland v. George S. May Intern. Co., 969 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
41. Id. at 173.
42. Id. at 168.
43. See also New Greenwich Litig. Tr., L.L.C. v. Citco Fund Servs. (EU)
B.V., 41 N.Y.S.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (applying New York law to determine
whether a Dutch forum selection clause was mandatory); Turnkey Projects Res.
v. Gawad, 198 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. App. 2016) (applying Florida law to determine
whether a Nigerian forum selection clause encompassed tort claims).
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interpretation,44 three cases involved only questions of enforceability, 45
and one involved both questions.46
However, in one of the latest cases, Weber v. PACT XPP
Technologies, AG,47 the court employed a choice-of-law analysis in
interpreting a German FS clause, though not in determining its
enforceability. The clause, written in German, provided that “Soweit
gesetzlich zulässig, ist Gerichtsstand und Erfüllungsort der Sitz der PACT
AG.”48 Partly translated into English, the clause would read as follows:
“To the extent permitted by law, jurisdiction and place of performance
shall be at the Sitz of PACT AG.” The untranslated word “Sitz” presented
the first problem of interpretation. The defendant company argued that it
meant the company’s statutory seat, or the place of incorporation, which
was in Munich, Germany.49 The plaintiff argued that it meant the
company’s “residence” or principal place of business, which, at the critical
time, was in the United States.50 The clause also presented a second
interpretation issue—whether it was mandatory or permissive—as well as
issues of enforceability, explained below. In a thoughtful opinion under
Texas conflicts law, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that German law should govern the interpretation of the FS clause and that
forum-federal law should govern its enforceability.51
The court stressed that “the question of enforceability is analytically
distinct from the issue of interpretation” and that “[o]nly after the court
44. See Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. 2017),
reh’g denied (Sept. 22, 2017) (Delaware FS clause); Marullo v. Apollo Associated
Servs., L.L.C., 515 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. App. 2017) (Washington FS clause); In re
Bloom Bus. Jets, L.L.C., 522 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 2017) (Colorado FS clause);
Akesogenx Corp. v. Zavala, 407 P.3d 246 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) (Delaware FS clause);
Krueger v. Pulse Evolution Corp., 2017 WL 3097660 (Tex. App. July 21, 2017).
45. See Durkovic v. Park West Galleries, Inc., 217 So. 3d 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017) (Turks & Caicos FS clause); Castro v. Pullmantur, S.A., 220 So. 3d
531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (Maltese FS clause); Olde Homestead Golf Club v.
Elec. Transaction Sys. Corp., 714 Fed. App’x. 186 (3d Cir. 2017) (Pennsylvania
forum, Virginia FS clause).
46. See In re Bambu Franchising, L.L.C., 2017 WL 4003428 (Tex. App. Sept.
12, 2017) (California FS clause).
47. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2016) (deciding
diversity jurisdiction case under Texas conflicts law).
48. Id. at 763. The contract was an employment contract between the
defendant—a company named PACT AG—and the plaintiff—its former CEO,
who was a German-born United States citizen domiciled in the United States. Id.
49. Id. at 762.
50. Id. at 769.
51. Id. at 764.
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has interpreted the contract to determine whether it is mandatory or
permissive does its enforceability come into play.”52 The court
acknowledged that several courts failed to recognize this distinction and
applied to both issues “general common-law contract principles without
addressing the precise source of that law.”53 Other courts recognize the
distinction but subject interpretation issues to a choice-of-law analysis
only if the contract contains a choice-of-law clause.54 In this case, the
contract did not contain such a clause, but, as the court reasoned, the
absence of such a clause did not relieve the court from its general
obligation to conduct a choice-of-law analysis.55 The need for such an
analysis was especially obvious in this case, which was laden with foreign
contacts and in which the defendant extensively pleaded and exhaustively
argued for the application of foreign law.56 The court concluded that “the
proper method” was “to apply Texas choice-of-law rules when interpreting
a [FS clause].”57 Because Texas follows the Second Restatement, the court
did likewise. It concluded that under §§ 6 and 188 of the Restatement,
Germany had the most significant relationship, and its law should govern
the interpretation of the forum selection clause.58 Under German law, (1)

52. Id. at 770.
53. Id. The plaintiff argued that the court should apply such “general common
law” and interpret the clause against its drafter, which was the company. Id.
54. See infra Part II.B.2–3.
55. As the court put it, cases employing a choice-of-law analysis when the
contract contains a choice-of-law clause do not “stand for the inverse proposition
that in the absence of a choice-of-law clause courts must apply general [forum]
law.” Weber, 811 F.3d at 770 n.19 (emphasis omitted).
56. See id. at 771 (“Courts may be justified in pretermitting this analysis
when neither party contends that any distinctive feature of the relevant substantive
law decides the dispute. And indeed, parties’ failure to brief choice-of-law
analysis or arguments about distinctive features of foreign law seems to have
driven many courts to default to general contract principles, even when they
recognize that either ordinary choice-of-law rules or a valid choice-of-law clause
would, in principle, dictate application of foreign law. But that is not the case here,
when the choice of law might be determinative . . . and the parties vigorously
dispute the proper source of law that should apply.”) (footnote omitted).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 772 (“This is a German-language contract, governing the
compensation of a German-born businessman by a German company for his
service on its supervisory board of directors, specifying that performance would
be in Munich and contemplating at least permissive jurisdiction in the German
courts for disputes arising under the contract. That the contract calls for
performance ‘at the corporate seat of PACT AG’—which the parties agree is in
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the word “Gerichtsstand” is a term of art that means jurisdiction and venue;
(2) the word “Sitz” refers to the corporate seat; and (3) a FS clause is
presumed to be—and in this case was—mandatory and exclusive rather than
permissive, thus mandating litigation at the defendant’s seat in Munich.59
The court then turned to the enforceability of the FS clause. The plaintiff
argued against enforcing the clause because, inter alia, the Munich court
would apply German law, under which the underlying employment contract
would be invalid for lack of ratification by the company’s shareholders, thus
denying plaintiff a contractual remedy.60 Interestingly, like most other
American courts, the Fifth Circuit did not conduct a choice-of-law analysis
in examining the enforceability of the clause.61 Instead, the court applied forum
law, which the court assumed must be federal law rather than state law.62 Under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas,63 the presence of a FS
clause establishes a virtually insurmountable presumption that the privateinterest factors imported from the forum non conveniens analysis mandate
dismissal of the lawsuit, unless, as “in truly extraordinary cases,” the publicinterest factors justify “disregarding the parties’ agreement.”64 The court found
that the plaintiff did not rebut this presumption.65
The court also noted that the invalidity of the underlying employment
contract did not prevent enforcement of the forum selection clause
because, under the American separability doctrine,66 which also is part of
German law, a party challenging the clause “must demonstrate that the
[clause itself] is invalid rather than merely claim the contract is invalid.”67
Finally, the court found that the lack of a contractual remedy under
German law did not mean the lack of any remedy because German law
provided other remedies on quasi-contractual or equitable grounds.68

Munich—likely settles the issue. Such a contractual specification of a place of
performance is generally independently conclusive as to what law to apply.”).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 774–75.
61. See supra notes 27–37.
62. Weber, 811 F.3d at 770.
63. See Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 571
U.S. 49 (2013).
64. Weber, 811 F.3d at 776. For a list of both the private-interest and publicinterest factors, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).
65. Weber, 811 F.3d at 775.
66. For the doctrine of separability of FS clauses from the contract that
contains them, see supra note 4.
67. Weber, 811 F.3d at 773.
68. Id.
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B. Scenario 3: Contracts with a Choice-of-Law Clause
In the third scenario, the contract contains a choice-of-law clause in
addition to the FS clause, and the action is filed in a forum other than the
one designated in the FS clause. This scenario occurs far more frequently
than either Scenario 1 or Scenario 2. Parties who have the foresight to seek
jurisdictional certainty through a FS clause also tend to be equally concerned
with choice-of-law certainty. In this situation, the seized court has the same
three options for the enforceability and interpretation of the FS clause as in
Scenario 2, namely: (1) apply the internal law of the seized forum—the lex
fori; (2) apply the substantive law of the forum designated in the FS clause;
or (3) apply the law that governs the underlying contract—lex contractus.

The difference from Scenario 2 is that in Scenario 3, the lex
contractus is the law designated by the parties in the choice-of-law
clause, rather than a law to be identified by the court through the
choice-of-law process, which often is laborious or indeterminate. In the
vast majority of cases, the law chosen in the choice-of-law clause is the
law of the same state as the one chosen in the FS clause.69 Because of
these differences, the dominance of the lex fori in Scenario 3 is not as
complete as in Scenario 2. As detailed below, in a handful of cases,
courts have applied the law designated in the choice-of-law clause in
deciding at least certain aspects of the FS clause. For example, in 2017,
nineteen appellate cases involved this scenario, of which:
(a) eight cases involved only questions of enforceability, and all
of them applied the law of the forum;70
(b) six cases involved only questions of interpretation. Five of
69. See supra note 13.
70. See Osborne v. Brown & Saenger, Inc., 904 N.W.2d 34 (N.D. 2017) (South
Dakota FS and choice-of-law clauses); Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners,
L.L.C., 890 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2017)
(New York FS and choice-of-law clauses); Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville
Operations, L.L.C., 523 S.W.3d 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), appeal denied (Tenn.
May 18, 2017) (California FS and choice-of-law clauses); Ex parte Jewels by Park
Lane, Inc., 2017 WL 2705578 (Ala. June 23, 2017) (Illinois FS and choice-of-law
clauses); Donnay USA, Ltd. v. Donnay Int’l S.A., 705 Fed. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2017)
(New York forum, English FS and choice-of-law clauses); Charney v. Standard Gen.,
L.P., 2017 WL 3599522 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2017) (Delaware FS and choice-oflaw clauses); Resolute Trans., Inc. v. Shofur, L.L.C., 2017 WL 1164527 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 29, 2017) (Georgia FS and choice-of-law clauses); Debello v. VolumeCocomo
Apparel, Inc., 2017 WL 6616704 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2017) (federal question case, New
York forum, California FS and choice-of-law clauses).
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them applied the law of the state chosen in the choice-of-law
clause,71 and one applied the law of the forum;72 and
(c) five cases involved questions of both interpretation and
enforceability. Two of them applied the law of the forum to both
questions,73 and three cases applied forum law to enforceability and
the chosen law to interpretation.74
1. Cases Applying Forum Law
As the above one-year summary illustrates, even in Scenario 3, the vast
majority of cases apply the lex fori. The same is true of previous years. The
cases that follow this option are too numerous to count, whether in state75
71. See Collins on Behalf of Herself v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2017)
(New Jersey forum, Texas FS and choice-of-law clauses); U.S. Chem. Storage, L.L.C.
v. Berto Constr., Inc., 800 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (New Jersey FS and choiceof-forum clauses); WorkFlex Solutions, L.L.C. v. Fifth Third Bank, 2017 WL 3392766
(Tex. App. Aug. 8, 2017) (Ohio FS and choice-of-law clauses); Spector v. Global
Aerospace Underwriting Managers, Ltd., 2017 WL 2806881 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29,
2017), review denied (Cal. Sept. 13, 2017) (German FS and choice-of-law clauses).
72. See Lab. Specialists Int’l, Inc. v. Shimadzu Sci. Instruments, Inc., 225
Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), as modified on denial of reh’g (Cal. Nov.
21, 2017) (Maryland FS and choice-of-law clauses).
73. See Rigsby v. Am. Credit Counselors, Inc., 215 So. 3d 526 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2017) (Florida FS and choice-of-law clauses); Reed v. Reilly Co., 534
S.W.3d 809 (Mont. 2017) (Kansas FS and choice-of-law clauses).
74. See Schwarz v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 802 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017)
(Minnesota FS and choice-of-law clauses); In re Kubler, 2017 WL 3326937 (Tex.
App. Aug. 4, 2017), mandamus denied (Tex. Aug. 25, 2017) (German FS and choiceof-law clauses); MBC Fin. Serv., Ltd. v. Bos. Merch. Fin., Ltd., 704 Fed. App’x 14
(2d Cir. 2017) (Swiss FS clause and British Virgin Islands choice-of-law clause).
75. See, e.g., Ex parte PT Solutions Holdings, L.L.C., 225 So. 3d 37 (Ala. 2016)
(Georgia forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses); Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc. v. JAAAT
Tech. Servs., L.L.C., 789 S.E.2d 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (Virginia forum selection and
choice-of-law clauses); Vardanyan v. Costa Rica Travel Planning, Inc., 2016 WL
7378545 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2016) (Colorado forum selection and choice-of-law
clauses); Campbell v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 2016 WL 817876 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 2, 2016) (Florida forum selection and choice-of-law clauses); Cohen v. Life Ins.
Co. of the Sw., 2016 WL 3411672 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 2016) (Texas forum selection
and choice-of-law clauses); Avanesians v. Coll. Network, Inc., 2016 WL 3570424 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 23, 2016) (Indiana forum selection clause and choice-of-law pointing to
the consumers’ home states); Robert Allen Taylor Co. v. United Credit Recovery,
L.L.C., 2016 WL 5640670 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2016) (Delaware forum selection
and choice-of-law clauses); W. Sky Fin., L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Olens, 793 S.E.2d 357
(Ga. 2016) (Indian tribe reservation forum selection clause and tribal law choice-of-law
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or federal76 courts. They are even more numerous if one were to include
cases that do not even consider the choice-of-law question and thus
“reflexively” apply forum law. As Professor Clermont observed, “The
great mass of cases presenting the problem do not expressly allude to it at
all, be that the fault of the judges or the lawyers.”77 He asks and then

clause); KC Ravens, L.L.C. v. Nima Scrap, L.L.C., 369 P.3d 341 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016)
(DC choice-of-law and FS clauses); Energy Claims, Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp., Ltd., 325
P.3d 70 (Utah 2014); Cagle v. Mathers Family Trust, 295 P.3d 460 (Colo. 2013); ProFootball, Inc. v. McCants, 51 A.3d 586 (Md. 2012); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 51 A.3d
544 (Md. 2012); Moon v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., Inc., 696 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010); Houseboat Store, L.L.C. v. Chris-Craft Corp., 692 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010); Golden Palm Hosp., Inc. v. Stearns Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 874 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004); Fendi v. Condotti Shops, Inc., 754 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Yamada Corp. v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 712 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. App. 1999).
76. See, e.g., Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe 1 v.
AOL, L.L.C., 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009); Fru–Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled
Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 2009); Wong v. PartyGaming, Ltd., 589 F.3d 821
(6th Cir. 2009); Ginter ex. rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d
439 (5th Cir. 2008); Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007); P &
S Bus. Machs. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2003); K & V Sci. Co. v.
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, 314 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 2002); Silva v. Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc., 239 F.3d 385 (1st Cir. 2001); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v.
Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998); Afram Carriers, Inc.
v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1998); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 148
F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998); Richard v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.
1998); Stamm v. Barclay’s Bank of N.Y., 153 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1998); Haynsworth v.
The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997); Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA
M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th Cir. 1997); New Moon Shipping Co. v. MAN B & W Diesel
AG, 121 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir.
1996); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995); Shell v. R.W. Sturge,
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Gen. Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co.,
29 F.3d 1095 (6th Cir. 1994); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993);
Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s,
996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969
F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865
(9th Cir. 1991); Polar Shipping, Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1981); Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 151, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2013);
Androutsakos v. M/V PSARA, No. 02-1173-KI, 2004 WL 1305802 (D. Or. Jan. 22,
2004); BNY AIS Nominees, Ltd. v. Quan, 609 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D. Conn. 2009);
Intermetals Corp. v. Hanover Int’l AG fur Industrieversicherungen, 188 F. Supp. 2d
454 (D.N.J. 2001); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke Nederland N.V., 41 F.
Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
77. Clermont, supra note 33, at 652.
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answers, “What are the cases that ignore the problem doing? They, of
course, are applying lex fori.”78
Energy Claims, Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group, Ltd.79 is a good example.
This case involved a contract that contained an English choice-of-law
clause in addition to an English FS clause.80 The plaintiff sued in Utah,
arguing, inter alia, that the FS clause was unenforceable because it was
contained in a stock subscription contract that was the product of fraud.81
Under the doctrine of separability, the FS clause is enforceable unless the
challenger proves that the clause itself, not just the contract, was the
product of fraud. The Supreme Court of Utah decided to join the minority
of courts that have rejected the doctrine of separability, subject to certain
conditions not relevant here.82 In reaching this decision and reversing the
lower court decision that had dismissed the action, the Utah Supreme
Court made no reference to English law, even though the court considered
the choice-of-law clause in interpreting the FS clause and determining
whether it encompassed tort claims.83
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa84 is another example of a case applying the
lex fori. It involved an employment contract between a professional
football player and his team, the Washington Redskins, a Maryland
corporation.85 The contract contained Virginia FS and choice-of-law
clauses.86 When, following an injury in the Redskins’ stadium in
Maryland, the player filed for workers’ compensation with the Maryland
Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Redskins challenged the
Commission’s jurisdiction, invoking the Virginia FS clause.87 In turn, the
player invoked § 9–104(a) of Maryland’s Labor and Employment Code,
which did not mention FS clauses but prohibited any agreement waiving
an employee’s rights under the statute.88 Applying this provision, the
Maryland court upheld the Commission’s jurisdiction, reasoning that the
Virginia FS clause was tantamount to the very waiver of the employee’s

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 653.
Energy Claims, Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp., Ltd., 325 P.3d 70 (Utah 2014).
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 85–86.
Id.
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 51 A.3d 544 (Md. 2012).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 545–47.
Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 548–49.
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rights that the provision prohibited.89 Again, the court made no reference
to Virginia law.
2. Cases Applying the Chosen Law
A small minority of cases applied the law chosen in the choice-of-law
clause in interpreting a FS clause contained in the same contract.90 As the
underscoring indicates, virtually all of these cases involved questions of
interpretation, not enforceability, of the FS clause. Specifically, most of
those cases involved the question of whether the clause was mandatory or
permissive.
Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.91 was one of these cases. The pertinent contract
contained a Swiss choice-of-law clause, and the question was whether a
clause stating that “Place of courts is Fribourg”92 was a mandatory or
permissive FS clause. The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that the tendency among some courts has been to apply reflexively
the lex fori but found that approach unsatisfactory.93 The court concluded

89. See id. at 549 (“Section 9–104(a), in plain, unambiguous language,
precludes an agreement which exempts an employer from the duty of paying
workers’ compensation benefits which are otherwise due under the Maryland
statute. The section also precludes an agreement which waives the right of an
employee to receive workers’ compensation benefits which are otherwise due
under the Maryland statute. A holding that forum selection clauses constitute an
exception to § 9–104 would contravene basic principles concerning the
interpretation of statutes.”).
90. See, e.g., Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 106 P.3d 719 (Utah
2005); Dunne v. Libbra, 330 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2003); Jacobson v. Mailboxes
Etc. USA, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1995); Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110
(1st Cir. 1993); Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143 (Idaho
1989); Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.
1986); Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Simon
v. Foley, No. 07–CV–766S, 2011 WL 4954790 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011); Lanier
v. Syncreon Holdings, Ltd., No. 11–14780, 2012 WL 3475680 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
14, 2012); Global Link, L.L.C. v. Karamtech Co., 06–CV–14938, 2007 WL
1343684 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2007); TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace Euro.
Grp., Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Kan. 2006), aff’d, 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir.
2007).
91. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006).
92. Id. at 423.
93. See id. at 428 (“A forum-selection clause is part of the contract. We see
no particular reason, at least in the international context, why a forum-selection
clause, among the multitude of provisions in a contract, should be singled out as
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that a court “should ordinarily honor an international commercial
agreement’s forum-selection provision as construed under the law
specified in the agreement’s choice-of-law provision.”94 The court
remanded the case to the district court to allow the parties to present
evidence on Swiss law.95 Upon remand, the district court dismissed the
case on forum non conveniens grounds, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal.96
In Enquip Technologies Group v. Tycon Technoglass,97 a contract
between an Italian manufacturer and its Florida-based United States sales
representative contained an Italian choice-of-law clause and a clause
stating that “[t]he law Court of Venice will be competent for any
dispute.”98 The Florida company sued the Italian manufacturer in Ohio,
where the manufacturer’s parent company had its headquarters, for breach
of contract and unpaid commissions.99 The court concluded that because a
choice-of-law clause accompanied the FS clause, the meaning of the latter
clause should be determined under the law chosen by the choice-of-law
clause, namely, Italian law.100 “A choice-of-law provision should be
considered as evidence of the meaning of a forum-selection clause in the
same contract,” said the court.101 “Just like [the] chosen law is used to
interpret every other provision in [the] contract, it also should be used to
interpret [the] forum-selection clause.”102 As noted earlier, the Brussels I
Regulation, which applies in Italy, provides that a FS clause “shall be
a provision not to be interpreted in accordance with the law chosen by the
contracting parties.”).
94. Id. at 430. The court arrived at this conclusion after endlessly quoting
from Supreme Court opinions favoring FS clauses and admitting that the opinions
did not address the precise issue at stake. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit opined
that their general disposition suggested that the meaning of FS clauses should be
determined under the contractually chosen law. See id. at 428 (“Supreme Court
opinions in international disputes emphasize the primacy of the parties’ agreement
regarding the proper forum. . . . Thus, when the contract contains a choice-of-law
clause, a court can effectuate the parties’ agreement concerning the forum only if
it interprets the forum clause under the chosen law.”).
95. Id. at 432.
96. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2009).
97. Enquip Techs. Grp. v. Tycon Technoglass, 986 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2012), appeal not allowed, 138 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2014-Ohio-566, 3 N.E.3d
1219 (Ohio 2013).
98. Id. at 474.
99. Id. at 473.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 476.
102. Id. at 477.
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exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”103 In light of this
provision, as well as a decision of the Italian Supreme Court, the Ohio
court held that “[t]he plain meaning of the forum-selection clause here in
Italian law is that the Court of Venice has exclusive jurisdiction.”104
This case, however, involved an additional issue that affected the
enforceability of the FS and choice-of-law clauses. One of the plaintiff’s
claims was that the defendant violated an Ohio statute that imposed triple
damages for failure to pay commissions to a sales representative who sells
in Ohio.105 The statute also prohibited non-Ohio choice-of-law or FS
clauses and declared null any waiver of its provisions.106 Because of this
statute, the court concluded that although the two clauses were enforceable
with regard to the plaintiff’s contract claims, the clauses were
unenforceable with regard to the plaintiff’s statutory claim for triple
damages for unpaid commissions.107
In TH Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd.,108
the contract contained a Dutch FS clause and a Dutch choice-of-law
clause. Under the law of the Kansas forum and of the Tenth Circuit, the
clause would be considered permissive.109 The court concluded that the
meaning of the FS clause should be determined under Dutch law because
103. See Brussels I, supra note 2.
104. Enquip Techs., 986 N.E.2d at 481. The court then explained its reasoning:
To be clear, we have not decided the permissive-exclusive issue strictly
as a choice-of-law issue. Rather, we have decided it simply as an issue
of contract interpretation. We applied Ohio contract-construction law to
the forum-selection clause. Ohio law says that the meaning of a forumselection clause is the meaning intended by the parties. Based on the
parties’ choice-of-law provision, which states that their agreement is to
be interpreted in accordance with Italian law, we concluded that the
meaning they intended is the forum-selection clause’s meaning in Italian
law. Consequently, we considered what meaning Italian law would give
to the clause’s language. We then determined that Italian law would give
the forum-selection clause an exclusive meaning.
Id.
105. See id. at 483–84.
106. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4113.62(D)(2) (2018).
107. The court explained, however, that this conclusion did “not mean that
Ohio law applies to determine these damages.” Enquip Techs., 986 N.E.2d at 482.
The court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to triple damages under
Ohio law and that it was unnecessary to choose between the laws of Florida and
Italy because neither of these laws provided for triple damages. Id.
108. TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace Euro. Grp., Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d
1054 (D. Kan. 2006).
109. Id. at 1075.
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(1) the language of the Dutch choice-of-law clause was broad enough to
encompass any and all issues arising under the contract and (2) even in the
absence of the choice-of-law clause, Dutch law would be applicable under
Kansas’s lex loci contractus rule.110 After discussing the voluminous and
conflicting expert testimony submitted by six experts on Dutch law, the
court concluded that the FS clause was presumptively exclusive, and the
defendant did not rebut the presumption.111
In Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd.,112 a contract between the
plaintiff, a Virginia seller, and the defendant, an English buyer, provided
that the contract “shall be subject to English Law and the jurisdiction of
the English High Court.”113 English law would consider this FS clause to
be exclusive, whereas federal caselaw, as well as a statute of South
Carolina, the forum state, would consider the clause permissive.114 The
United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when the contract
contains a choice-of-law clause, the court must apply the chosen law to
interpret the FS clause.115 The court noted that, “taken by itself and out of
context,” the FS clause appeared to make the designation of the English
court permissive.116 When “taken in context,” however, the clause
contained what amounted to “language of exclusion” because it provided
that “English law, not American federal law, must be applied” and
“applying English law makes a difference.”117 Based on this reasoning, the
court held that the FS clause was exclusive and affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the action.118
The appellate court also opined that even under South Carolina law,119
the clause would be considered exclusive because South Carolina honors

110. Id. at 1074–79.
111. Id. at 1079.
112. Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., 628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2010).
113. Id. at 646.
114. Id. at 651.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 653.
119. The court’s main holding was that a federal court interpreting a FS clause
“must apply federal law in doing so . . . [because] a forum selection clause
implicates what is recognized as a procedural matter governed by federal law—
the proper venue of the court,” id. at 650, and that federal law on this issue
preempted contrary state law, such as the aforementioned South Carolina statute,
see id. at 652 (“[I]nsofar as the South Carolina statue would purport to impose
South Carolina procedural rules on a federal court, it would be preempted by
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choice-of-law clauses unless the chosen law is contrary to the state’s
strong public policy.120 In the court’s opinion, the aforementioned South
Carolina statute, which prohibited outbound exclusive FS clauses, did not
reflect a strong public policy.121 Thus, the court concluded that under
either federal or state law, “English law must be applied, and it takes the
clause as mandatory.”122
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the contract contained
California choice-of-law and FS clauses.123 Noting that the California
choice-of-law clause was valid, the Supreme Court of Montana decided to
apply California law “in interpreting the forum selection clause.”124 After
discussing numerous California precedents, the court concluded that the
clause was mandatory because it stipulated the parties “consent to conduct
all . . . proceedings . . . in the city of San Diego, California.”125
In Barnett v. DynCorp International, L.L.C., a diversity case filed in
federal court in Texas, the court held that the FS clause was enforceable
under both federal law and the law chosen in the choice-of-law clause.126
The contract contained a Kuwaiti choice-of-law clause and a FS clause
conferring exclusive jurisdiction to Kuwaiti courts.127 The defendant, a
Texas company, hired the plaintiff, a Georgia resident, for work in
Kuwait.128 The plaintiff challenged the FS clause under Texas law,
arguing, inter alia, that he would not have any remedy under Kuwaiti law,

federal law . . . [, which] explicitly regulates the appropriate venue in cases filed
in federal court.”).
120. Id. at 653.
121. See S.C. CODE § 15-7-120(A) (2018). The court noted that
under state law, a state provision establishing, as a procedural matter,
that the South Carolina venue rules trump any contractual agreement
selecting an exclusive forum outside of South Carolina is not the type of
provision that South Carolina courts have recognized as establishing a
strong public policy of the State that would overrule the parties choice
of law outside South Carolina.
Albemarle Corp., 628 F.3d at 653. The court cited Nash v. Tindall Corp., 650
S.E.2d 81, 83–84 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007), which did not involve this issue or an
analogous one.
122. Albemarle Corp., 628 F.3d at 653.
123. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 329 P.3d 1264 (Mont. 2014).
124. Id. at 1268.
125. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added).
126. Barnett v. DynCorp Int’l, L.L.C., 831 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2016) (decided
under Texas conflicts law).
127. Id. (decided under Texas conflicts law).
128. Id. at 299.
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which imposed a one-year statute of repose that would bar his action.129
His action, however, was timely under Texas’s statute of limitations.130 He
specifically invoked § 16.070 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code, which provided that “a stipulation, contract, or agreement that
establishes a limitations period that is shorter than two years is void in this
state.”131
The plaintiff tried to frame this issue as a question of “validity” rather
than “enforceability” of the clause.132 The court saw these terms as
synonymous but reasoned that even if they were not, the plaintiff could
not prevail because in either case the applicable law would be either
federal law or the law that would be applicable under Texas’s choice-oflaw rules—that is, Kuwaiti law,133 and that the FS clause was enforceable
under both laws.134 The court found that under Texas’s choice-of-law
rules, specifically § 187 of the Second Restatement,135 the Kuwaiti choiceof-law clause was enforceable because (1) Kuwait had a “substantial
relationship” with the case; (2) Kuwaiti law would have been applicable
even in the absence of the choice-of-law clause because the contract called
for services in Kuwait; and (3) “[E]ven . . . assum[ing] that Texas law
would apply absent a choice-of-law provision, and further . . . that Texas
has a materially greater interest”136 in applying its law, the application of
Kuwaiti law would not violate a “fundamental policy” of Texas.137
Finally, in Summit Diamond Bridge Lenders, L.L.C. v. Philip R.
Seaver Title Co., Inc., a Michigan appellate court also applied the law
selected in the choice-of-law clause, but it ultimately held the FS clause
129. Id. at 300–01.
130. Id. at 300.
131. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.070 (2005).
132. Barnett, 831 F.3d at 301–02.
133. Id. at 303.
134. The court discussed at length the question of whether federal courts
sitting in diversity must apply federal law or state law in determining the
enforceability or validity of a FS clause. The court noted the circuit split on this
question and discussed the pros and cons of each option, but it decided not to
answer the question because it concluded that the plaintiff could not prevail under
either option. See id. at 303–04. The court reiterated that under the state-law
option, “we would not automatically apply Texas’s substantive law; rather, we
would apply the state’s choice-of-law rules. Under those rules, Texas law would
control only if the Agreement’s choice-of-law clause—which ‘exclusively’
selects Kuwaiti law to govern the Agreement and disputes between the parties—
is itself unenforceable.” Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 304–05.
136. Id. at 306.
137. Id.
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unenforceable under both the chosen law and the law of the forum state.138
An escrow agreement between a California lender, a Michigan borrower,
and a Michigan escrow agent contained a California choice-of-law clause
and a FS clause providing that “[a]ny dispute arising from or related to this
Agreement . . . shall be handled by the appropriate state or federal court
located in California.”139 When the borrower sued the escrow agent in
Michigan, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based
on the FS clause.140
The court of appeal reversed the dismissal, following an obviously
flawed interpretation of a California statute.141 The court accepted the
plaintiff’s argument that when the contract contains both a choice-of-law
clause and a FS clause, the enforceability of the latter clause should be
determined under the law of the state designated in the former clause—in
this case, California.142 This reasoning led the court to a California statute,
reproduced above,143 which provides that “[a]ny person may maintain an
action” in California courts against a foreign corporation if the action
arises out of an agreement that contains California choice-of-law and FS
clauses and the underlying transaction “involve[es] in the aggregate not
less than one million dollars.”144 The court read the last quoted phrase as
preventing California courts from entertaining actions in which, as in this
case, the underlying transaction falls short of the $1 million mark.145 Based
on this reasoning, the court found that the California FS clause would be
unenforceable in California.146

138. Summitt Diamond Bridge Lenders, L.L.C. v. Philip R. Seaver Title Co.,
No. 326679, 2016 WL 7427500 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016).
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id.
141. See infra note 146.
142. See Summit Diamond, 2016 WL 7427500, at *3.
143. See CAL CIV. PROC CODE § 410.40 (2004).
144. Summit Diamond, 2016 WL 7427500, at *3 (quoting § 410.40).
145. Id.
146. The court’s interpretation of the California statute is obviously erroneous.
As the dissenting judge pointed out, the statute was designed “not to preclude
anything, but rather specifically to attract big-ticket litigation to California by
expressly allowing parties to maintain actions against foreign corporations under
forum-selection clauses if the dollar value and other criteria are met.” Id. at *9
(Boonstra, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). The statute is similar to statutes
enacted in other states, such as Delaware, Florida, Ohio, Texas, and New York,
in hopes of attracting high value litigation in their courts. See supra note 10. The
statute simply is inapplicable to cases involving lesser amounts, leaving courts to
entertain those cases under general principles.
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The court then turned to a Michigan statute which, in some respects,
is the reverse of the California statute in that it defines the circumstances
in which Michigan courts should not enforce a FS clause, mandating
litigation in a state other than Michigan.147 One of those circumstances is
when the “plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state for
reasons other than delay in bringing the action.”148 The court found this
provision applicable, reasoning that the “plaintiff cannot secure effective
relief in California because the parties’ action fails to meet the threshold
jurisdictional amount required to maintain an action against a foreign
corporation in a California court.”149 Thus, the court held the FS clause
unenforceable under both California law and Michigan law and allowed
the action to go forward.150
3. Cases Distinguishing Between Enforceability and Interpretation
In recent years, some courts have begun distinguishing between
interpretation and enforceability of FS clauses. Phillips v. Audio Active,
Ltd.,151 a federal court case, was one of the first cases to articulate this
promising distinction clearly. The United States Second Circuit Court of
Appeals outlined a four-part inquiry in examining FS clauses when the
contract also contains a choice-of-law clause. The first three parts consist of
determining (1) whether the clause was “reasonably communicated to the
party resisting enforcement”;152 (2) whether the clause is mandatory or
permissive; and (3) whether the clause encompasses the claims in
question.153 If the court finds that the clause was reasonably communicated,
mandatory, and covered the claims in question, the clause is presumptively
enforceable.154 In the fourth part of the inquiry, the court determines whether
the resisting party has rebutted the presumption by proving any of the
defenses that the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co. allows—namely, demonstrating that the clause is “unaffected by
fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,” or its
“enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which
suit is brought” or would be “unreasonable under the circumstances.”155
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at *5–6 (majority opinion).
Id. at *6 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.745(3) (2016)).
Id.
Id. at *5, *7.
Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 383.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 386.
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 12, 15 (1972).
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The court concluded that even if the contract contained a choice-oflaw clause, federal law as forum law must govern the fourth part of the
inquiry “because enforcement of forum clauses is an essentially procedural
issue . . . while choice of law provisions generally implicate only the
substantive law of the selected jurisdiction.”156 The court also noted,
however, that there was “less to recommend the invocation of federal
common law to interpret the meaning and scope of a forum clause, as
required by parts two and three of [the above] analysis.”157 For these
issues, the court cited with approval the Yavuz case, which applied the
chosen law in interpreting a FS clause.158
In Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P.,159 the same court had an opportunity
to apply the distinction between questions of enforceability and
interpretation. The court held that the lex fori should govern the questions
of enforceability and the chosen law, the questions of interpretation.160
Martinez was a federal question case arising out of an employment
contract that contained English choice-of-law and FS clauses.161 The court
held that (1) the substantive law designated in the choice-of-law clause—
in this case English law—governed the interpretation of the FS clause; and
(2) the law of the forum—in this case federal law—governed the
enforceability of the FS clause.162 The court found that under English law,
the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims fell within the scope of
the FS clause and that the clause was unenforceable under federal law.163
The court explained at length why forum/federal law should govern
questions of enforceability:
Federal law must govern the ultimate enforceability of a forum
selection clause to ensure that a federal court may [under The
Bremen] decline to enforce a clause if “trial in the contractual
forum [would] be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the
resisting party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his
day in court,” or “if enforcement would contravene a strong public
156. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384–85.
157. Id. at 385.
158. See id. (quoting Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428–30 (10th Cir.
2006)), discussed supra notes 91–96. In the end, the Phillips court did not have to
apply the chosen law of England because neither of the parties had argued for its
application.
159. Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P., 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014).
160. Id. at 214.
161. Id. at 214–15.
162. Id. at 214.
163. Id.
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policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by
statute or by judicial decision.”164
Next, the court explained that the chosen law should govern the
interpretation of the FS clause because forum law could
undermine the predictability fostered by forum selection clauses,
. . . frustrate the contracting parties’ expectations by giving a
forum selection clause a broader or narrower scope in a federal
court than it was intended to have, . . . [and] transform a clause
that would be construed as permissive under the parties’ chosen
law into a mandatory clause, or vice versa.165
The court also reasoned that distinguishing between enforceability and
interpretation of FS clauses “accords with the traditional divide between
procedural and substantive rules developed under Erie.”166 The
enforceability of a FS clause is a procedural question that must be
governed by forum/federal law, whereas the interpretation of a contract is
“quintessentially substantive for Erie purposes.”167
For reasons explained in Part III,168 the distinction between
interpretation and enforceability is promising and eminently sensible, even
if many cases involve only one of the two categories169 and even if some
courts fail to see the difference. For example, one court used the term
“interpretation of the validity.”170 In another case, Raydiant Technology,
L.L.C. v. Fly-N-Hog Media Group, Inc.,171 the plaintiff claimed fraud in
the inducement of the contract,172 which is clearly a matter of
enforceability, not interpretation. Although both parties relied exclusively
on forum law, the court decided to apply the contractually chosen law.173
164. Id. at 218 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18
(1972)).
165. Id. at 220.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 221.
168. See infra Part III.B.
169. For example, of the 37 appellate cases decided in 2017 (see supra notes
14, 44–46, 70–74), 14 cases involved only questions of enforceability, 16 cases
involved only questions of interpretation, and 7 cases involved both questions.
170. Szymczyk v. Signs Now Corp., 606 S.E.2d 728, 733 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005).
171. Raydiant Tech., L.L.C. v. Fly-N-Hog Media Grp., Inc., 439 S.W.3d 238
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
172. Id. at 239.
173. Id. at 240–41.
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Mixing enforcement with interpretation, the court reasoned that “where,
as here, the case turns on the enforcement of a forum-selection clause, and
the contract includes a choice-of-law provision, the law chosen by the
parties controls the interpretation of the forum-selection clause.”174
Similarly, in Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., the court stated that
the chosen law should govern both the enforceability and the interpretation
of the FS clause, but actually, the case involved only the latter issue—
whether the clause encompassed pre-contract wrongs.175 The same was
true in TH Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group, Ltd.176
The court spoke of “analyzing the enforceability of the forum selection
clause under the [chosen] law of The Netherlands,”177 but the case
involved only an issue of interpretation—whether the clause was exclusive
or permissive.
Other courts, however, show a better understanding of the distinction
between interpretation and enforceability. For example, in Albemarle
Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., the court applied the chosen law to
interpretation and, after finding that the clause was exclusive under that
law, the court examined whether enforcement of the FS clause would
violate the public policy of the forum state.178 Similarly, in Rudgayzer v.
Google, Inc.,179 a New York federal case, the court applied California law
in interpreting the clause and federal/forum law in determining its
enforceability.180 In Simon v. Foley, the court concluded that the chosen
law should govern the interpretation and forum law the enforceability of
the clause.181 After finding that under the chosen law the clause was
permissive, the court allowed the action to proceed because the defendant
was unable to challenge the enforceability of the clause under the law of
the forum.182 In Lanier v. Syncreon Holdings, Ltd., the court followed the

174. Id. at 240 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1995).
176. TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace Euro. Grp., Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d
1054 (D. Kan. 2006).
177. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added).
178. Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., 628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2010),
discussed supra note 112.
179. Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
180. Id. For an earlier case following exactly the same distinction, see AVC
Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P’ship, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
181. Simon v. Foley, No. 07–CV–766S, 2011 WL 4954790 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.
18, 2011).
182. Id. at *6–7.
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same distinction.183 After finding that the clause was mandatory under the
chosen law of Ireland, the court examined the enforceability of the clause
under the law of the forum and found it enforceable.184
In other cases, the court applied the chosen law in determining the
enforceability of the FS clause but only after finding that enforcement of
the clause did not offend the forum’s public policy.185 Finally, in CeramiKote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., the court appeared willing to apply the
chosen law in determining enforceability but eventually applied forum law
through renvoi from the chosen law.186 The contract contained Florida FS
and choice-of-law clauses.187 In examining Florida precedents, the Idaho
court learned that Florida courts would enforce a FS clause but only if
enforcement “would not contravene a strong policy enunciated by statute
or judicial fiat, either in the forum where the suit would be brought, or the
forum from which the suit has been excluded.”188 The italicized phrase
meant that a Florida court would not enforce the FS clause if it violated a
strong public policy of Idaho. The court concluded that this was such a
case because of the strong public policy embodied in an Idaho statute that
prohibited foreign FS clauses in contracts like the one involved in this
case.189
III. SUMMARY, CRITIQUE, AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary purpose of this Article is diagnostic—to determine how
American courts answer the difficult question of what law governs FS
clauses rather than to posit one answer as the only right one. In keeping
with this purpose, Part III begins by providing a summary of judicial
practice. It then continues with the Article’s secondary purpose, which is
to explain and, in some respects, defend this practice. To this end, subpart
B reiterates the need for a distinction between interpretation and
enforceability, subpart C supports the need for a choice-of-law analysis
for questions of enforceability, and subpart D defends the courts’ practice
in applying the internal law of the forum to questions of enforceability of
FS clauses.
183. Lanier v. Syncreon Holdings, Ltd., No. 11-14780, 2012 WL 3475680
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2012).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1993); Gen. Eng’g
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986).
186. Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 1989).
187. Id. at 1144–45.
188. Id. at 1146 (emphasis partially omitted).
189. Id. at 1147.
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A. Summary of Judicial Practice
As the preceding discussion documents, American courts have
provided different answers to the question of what law governs a FS
clause, depending on (1) whether the case is litigated in the court chosen
or a court not chosen in the clause and (2) whether the case involves the
interpretation or the enforceability of the clause. These answers are
summarized below and depicted in Figure 2.
In Scenario 1, which consists of cases in which the action is filed in
the court chosen in the FS clause, the courts apply the internal law of the
forum state without any choice-of-law analysis. They apply that law both
in interpreting the clause and in deciding whether it is enforceable. In
Scenario 2, which consists of cases in which the action is filed in a court
other than the one designated in the FS clause and the contract does not
contain a choice-of-law clause, the courts apply the internal law of the
forum state in determining whether the clause is enforceable. A few cases
undertake a choice-of-law analysis but only in interpreting the clause.
Finally, in Scenario 3, which consists of cases in which the action is filed
in a court other than the one designated in the FS clause and the contract
does contain a choice-of-law clause, the courts, by and large, apply (1) the
internal law of the forum state in determining whether the FS clause is
enforceable; and (2) the law chosen in the choice-of-law clause in
interpreting the FS clause.
FIGURE 2. LAW GOVERNING ENFORCEABILITY AND INTERPRETATION
OF FS CLAUSES

Scenario 1.
Action in
chosen
court

Scenario 2.
Action in
seized court /
No choice-oflaw clause

Scenario 3.
Action in
seized court
and choiceof-law clause

Enforceability

Lex fori

Lex fori

Lex fori

Interpretation

Lex fori

Lex contractus

Chosen law
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B. Separating Enforceability from Interpretation
As some courts have noted, the question of the enforceability of FS
clauses is entirely different from the question of their interpretation, and
distinguishing between the two “accords with the traditional divide between
procedural and substantive rules.”190 In other words, “Questions of venue
and the enforcement of forum selection clauses are essentially procedural,
rather than substantive, in nature.”191 Although some people might question
this characterization, not many people would question that the interpretation
of FS clauses—like the interpretation of a contract—is a “quintessentially
substantive”192 question. Consequently, like any other substantive question,
it should not be answered by the law of the forum qua forum. Instead, this
question should be subject to the choice-of-law inquiry, which may or may
not lead to the law of the forum.
The necessity for such an inquiry is more evident in Scenario 3 cases,
namely cases in which the action is filed in a state other than the one whose
courts are chosen in the FS clause and in which an outbound choice-of-law
clause accompanies the FS clause. As long as the case is multistate,
however, a choice-of-law inquiry is necessary and appropriate even in
Scenario 2 cases, in which the FS selection clause is not accompanied by a
choice-of-law clause. Finally, even in Scenario 1 cases in which the action
is filed in the state whose courts are chosen in the FS clause, a choice-oflaw inquiry is appropriate even if it is unlikely to lead to the law of another
state.
C. Law Governing Enforceability
Once interpretation is separated from enforceability, one can address
with a clearer mind the question of what law should govern the
enforceability of FS clauses. In all three scenarios, the vast majority of
United States courts apply the internal law of the forum state in determining
whether a FS clause is enforceable and, more often than not, do so without
a choice-of-law inquiry. Is this a defensible practice?
In a comprehensive and thoughtful article, Professor Jason Yackee
sharply criticized this “lex fori bias.”193 He found “little inherent

190.
191.
192.
193.

Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P., 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014).
Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990).
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 221.
Yackee, supra note 1, at 44, 47, 74, 79, 85, 88.
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justification for automatically applying lex fori to questions of []
enforceability and validity”194 of FS clauses because such a practice
risks subjecting the contract to multiple laws, . . . makes it difficult
for parties to anticipate at the contract drafting stage which law will
actually be applied to [the clause], . . . may promote forum
shopping, and . . . ignores the parties’ bargained-for jurisdictional
expectations by overlooking a contract’s explicit or implicit choice
of law.195
Yackee argued that
[FS clauses] should be governed first and foremost by the parties’
explicit choice of law. When the parties have apparently
concluded a choice of law clause that covers the contract in which
the [clause] is located or referenced, that apparent choice should
govern [the clause’s] validity and enforceability. In the event that
the parties have not made an explicit choice, the law of the
designated forum should govern the [clause]. That law has the
highest probability of corresponding to the parties’ bargained-for
jurisdictional expectations in the absence of an explicit choice of
law.196
In an equally comprehensive and thoughtful article, Professor Kevin
Clermont defended the current American practice of applying the lex fori
in determining the enforceability of FS clauses while agreeing with the
application of the chosen law in interpreting them. He offered several
arguments in support of the lex fori, including the following:
Applying lex fori to the forum-selection clause allows the court to
control its own jurisdiction and venue, and to do so by uniform
rules.
Lex fori would avoid the discomfort of sometimes allowing
foreign law to determine whether jurisdiction or venue exists in
the seised court.
In some thin sense, jurisdiction and venue come first, and so the
court should decide those questions before performing a choiceof-law analysis.
Lex fori would avoid the slight, and not insuperable, illogic of
assuming an enforceable forum-selection or choice-of-law clause
194. Id. at 83.
195. Id. (footnotes omitted).
196. Id. at 94.
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in order to choose the law to determine enforceability.
For good reasons, courts do not normally interpret choice-of-law
clauses to cover procedural matters; the enforceability of the
separable forum-selection clause, sensibly and practically
considered, appears procedural for this purpose.
Applying lex fori, rather than the chosen law, to the forumselection clause closes the door to abusive clauses: the parties
could be bootstrapping the forum-selection clause into
enforceability by choosing a very permissive law, and the stronger
party could be forcing the weaker party into an unfair forum
applying unfair law.197
D. Defending the Choice of the Lex Fori in Some Cases
All things considered, Clermont has the better arguments. His last
argument is particularly persuasive, especially because, unlike other
countries that do not enforce pre-dispute choice-of-forum clauses that are
unfavorable to consumers or employees,198 American law does not accord
any a priori protective treatment to these or any other presumptively weak
parties. As Professor Linda Mullenix noted,
The [Supreme] Court consistently has turned a blind eye and deaf
ear on the problem of consumer forum-selection and arbitration
clauses, instead merging consideration of consumer agreements
with jurisprudence developed in the dissimilar context of
sophisticated business partners freely negotiating at arm’s
length.199
Mullenix points out that this regime “works to the advantage of prospective
corporate defendants who . . . exploit forum-selection and choice-of-law
clauses to their advantage”200 and at the expense of uninformed and
unsophisticated consumers, employees, franchisees, or other presumptively

197. Clermont, supra note 33, at 65455 (footnotes omitted).
198. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 441 (discussing the relevant provisions
of the Brussels I Regulation). Likewise, the Hague Choice of Court Convention
does not apply to consumer and employment contracts. See Hague Convention,
supra note 2, art. 2(1).
199. Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from
Unconscionable Contractual Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 719, 719 (2015).
200. Id. at 743.
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weak parties.201 The result is that FS clauses often “provide defendants
with a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ forum preference.”202
In other words, the current regime in the United States is bad enough as
it is—and will remain so, as long as American courts are unwilling to follow
the example of other systems, which accord protective treatment to weak
parties.203 It would be even worse, however, if, in contracts involving these
parties, the courts were required to apply the law designated in the choiceof-law clause, a clause usually drafted by the corporate defendant, virtually
never negotiated, and often unsuspectingly imposed on the weak party.
Petersen v. Boeing Co.,204 an employment contract case, illustrates the
potential consequences. The plaintiff, an American citizen, was hired in the
United States for work in Saudi Arabia through a preliminary agreement that
did not contain a FS clause.205 Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, however, “he
was forced to sign a second employment agreement—which he was not
given time to read and which he was told he must sign or else return

201. Professor Mullenix continues,
The entire doctrine surrounding the sanctity of forum-selection and
arbitration clauses in the consumer arena essentially has been
constructed based on a series of somewhat fantastical premises about
these agreements. It first assumes that the contracting parties consist of
a (sophisticated) consumer and a corporate or business entity. The
doctrine assumes a knowledgeable consumer who understands that at
some future point, the consumer may be involved in a dispute with the
business entity. The doctrine assumes that this consumer understands
what a forum choice means . . . . It assumes that this consumer
understands the consequences of a forum or choice-of-law designation.
The doctrine assumes that the consumer has read the agreement and
noticed and read the forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration
clause. The doctrine assumes that the consumer willingly agrees, in
advance of any dispute, to waive its choice of forum . . . . The doctrine
assumes that the consumer (or employee, or small consumer/investor) is
receiving some unspecified economic benefit from agreeing to the
forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration provision. The doctrine
assumes, as Justice Alito put it in Atlantic Marine, that the consumer
knowingly and willingly waives its “venue privilege.”
But what if none of this . . . is true?
Id. at 755–56.
202. Id. at 736 (“[F]orum-selection clauses will almost always provide
defendants with a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ forum preference.”).
203. See supra note 2, referring to the Brussels I Regulation and the Hague
Choice of Court Convention.
204. Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 2013).
205. Id. at 278–79.
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immediately to the United States at his own expense.”206 This agreement
contained a FS clause requiring any contractual disputes to be resolved in
the Labor Courts of Saudi Arabia.207 The plaintiff returned to the United
States and, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, sued the defendant,
alleging facts that not only showed the difficulties of litigating in Saudi
Arabia but also raised legitimate doubts about whether a valid forum
selection clause existed in the first place.208 Despite these circumstances,
the district court dismissed the action without a hearing for improper venue
under Rule 12(b)(3).209 Fortunately for the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to
conduct such a hearing and to determine (1) whether the clause was the
result of fraud or overreaching; and (2) whether its enforcement under
these circumstances would effectively deny the plaintiff his day in court.210
On remand, the district court held the clause unenforceable, finding
that because of their discriminatory practices, the Labor Courts of Saudi
Arabia were not an adequate forum for plaintiff’s claims. 211
206. Id. at 278; see also id. at 279 (“[The plaintiff’s] passport was then
confiscated; he was effectively imprisoned in his housing compound under
miserable living conditions; and his work environment was marked by rampant
safety and ethics violations. When he attempted to resign and return to the United
States, his employer refused to return his passport for a period of nearly three
months.”).
207. Id. at 278–79.
208. The plaintiff attached to his complaint a United States State Department
Report showing that (1) Saudi authorities would not grant him a visa to re-enter
Saudi Arabia; (2) if he did re-enter Saudi Arabia, his employer could detain him for
the entire duration of any legal proceedings because employers “may ask authorities
to prohibit the employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved,
often with the intent to force the employee to accept a disadvantageous settlement
or risk deportation without any settlement”; and (3) he could not have a fair trial in
Saudi Arabia because the Saudi judiciary “was not independent and . . . was subject
to influence by powerful individuals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Id. at 279.
210. The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations, corroborated by evidence,
were sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the FS was
enforceable and that the district court had abused its discretion in dismissing the
action without a hearing. Id.
211. See Petersen v. Boeing Co., 108 F. Supp. 3d 726, 731 (D. Ariz. 2015)
(“Both experts testified that the Saudi Labor Courts (and other Saudi courts)
employ discriminatory evidentiary rules. A Saudi court will only credit testimony
if corroborated by two male, Muslim witnesses. This discrimination has direct
bearing on Plaintiff’s case since his claims are largely based on events not
memorialized in writing or otherwise recorded. . . . Furthermore, it is undisputed
Plaintiff lacks male Muslin [sic] witnesses to support his claims.”).
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Interestingly—and appropriately—the court based this holding on
federal/forum law rather than on Saudi law, even though the employment
contract also contained a Saudi choice-of-law clause.212 The court did not
even mention the choice-of-law clause in deciding the enforceability of
the FS clause, even though in an earlier—and erroneous—ruling it held
that the choice-of-law clause was perfectly enforceable in governing the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.213
Indeed, “[r]espect for party autonomy”214 simply is not a persuasive
reason for referring the validity and enforceability of a FS clause to the
chosen law. Party autonomy in the choice of substantive law has never
been unrestricted.215 A fortiori, it should not be unrestricted in the choice
of forum. Forum selection clauses are different from choice-of-law
clauses, but the differences suggest less, not more, deference to the former
clauses, precisely because their enforcement prevents the seized court
from adjudicating the merits. The Supreme Court in The Bremen correctly
discounted as “a vestigial legal fiction”216 the notion that FS clauses, of
their own force, “oust” a court of its jurisdiction.217 They do so only
because the law of the seized court endows them with that effect. It is
simplistic to pretend that a FS clause has no effect on the jurisdiction of
the seized court. When the seized court chooses to abide by a clause
designating another court, the result is that the seized court cannot, or at
least will not, hear the merits.
The question then is whether, in exercising this “choice,” the seized
court should follow its own law and policy or, instead, those of another
sovereign. One way of answering this question is to say, as some courts
have,218 that the enforceability of a FS selection is a procedural issue,
which, like all procedural issues, is governed by the law of the forum
without resorting to a choice-of-law analysis. This answer, however, is
rather simplistic. For example, the statutes that prohibit outbound FS
clauses in certain contracts, such as consumer or employment contracts,219
212. Id. at 731–33.
213. See Petersen v. Boeing Co., 2014 WL 12516257 (D. Ariz. July 1, 2014),
reconsideration denied, 2014 WL 12527691 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2014).
214. Yackee, supra note 1, at 96 (urging “respect for party autonomy, both to
choose an exclusive forum in which future disputes may be heard, and to choose,
explicitly or implicitly, the law that will govern that jurisdictional choice”).
215. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 36879.
216. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., id. at 10, 12, 15.
219. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921.A(2) (2018) (“The provisions of
every employment contract . . . by which any . . . employer . . . includes a choice

1158

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

clearly are substantive. Nevertheless, by mandating their application to
cases falling within their scope, these statutes express the state’s strong
public policy in providing an in-state forum to the affected consumers or
employees. Neither a choice-of-law clause, which many of these statutes
expressly prohibit, nor the welcoming statutes of another state should
negate that policy. As the Second Circuit noted from the perspective of a
federal court, “If the enforceability of a forum selection clause were
governed by the law specified in the choice-of-law clause, then contracting
parties would have an absolute right to ‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the federal
courts.”220 The court reasoned that to abide by the standards set by the
Supreme Court in The Bremen, federal law—and by analogy in state cases
forum law—
must govern the ultimate enforceability of a forum selection
clause to ensure that a federal court may decline to enforce a
clause if “trial in the contractual forum [would] be so gravely
difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court,” or “if
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
in which suit is brought . . . .”221
One such strong public policy is—or should be—the protection of
presumptively weak parties. If left unchecked, a clever combination of FS
clauses and choice-of-law clauses easily can evade that policy. Suppose,
for example, that State X has a pro-business law and an unduly liberal law
of forum clause or choice of law clause . . . shall be null and void except where
the choice of forum clause or choice of law clause is expressly, knowingly, and
voluntarily agreed to and ratified by the employee after the occurrence of the
incident which is the subject of the civil or administrative action.”); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, any
provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution
of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the contract to be
instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is void and
unenforceable. This prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer loan transactions
or to any action or arbitration of a dispute that is commenced in another state
pursuant to a forum selection provision with the consent of all parties to the
contract at the time that the dispute arises.”).
220. Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P., 740 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2014).
221. Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 18); see also id. at 220 (“To
ensure that federal courts account for both the important interests served by forum
selection clauses and the strong public policies that might require federal courts
to override such clauses, therefore, federal law must govern their
enforceability.”).
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in favoring FS clauses. For those reasons, the strong contracting party—
for example, a corporate defendant—imposes on the weak party—for
example, a consumer—the “choice” of State X’s courts and law, even
though State X has only a nominal connection with the case. Do other
states owe a blank check to the strong party?
As documented elsewhere, such a combination of choice-of-law and
FS clauses can be deadly for consumers or employees.222 Franchisees are
equally vulnerable to the superior bargaining power of franchisors, which
is why many states have enacted statutes regulating franchise contracts in
detail and prohibiting the waiver of franchisee protection.223 Many of those
statutes specifically prohibit outbound choice-of-law clauses, and a few of
them prohibit outbound FS causes.224 The protection that these prohibitions
seek to provide would become meaningless if those states were required to
apply the contractually chosen law to determine the enforceability of an
outbound FS clause that the statute directly or indirectly prohibits.
Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc. is an
example of this scenario, although the chosen forum was in the
franchisor’s home state and thus did not lack a connection with the case.225
A contract between a California franchisor and a New Jersey franchisee
contained a California choice-of-law clause and an exclusive California
FS clause.226 The New Jersey Franchise Act did not expressly prohibit
these clauses, but it did prohibit waivers of other franchisee-protecting
provisions.227 When the franchisor terminated the franchise, the franchisee
sued the franchisor in New Jersey.228 The trial court dismissed the action
based on the California FS clause.229 The intermediate court affirmed,
reasoning that it “should trust the courts of California to be as protective
of the rights of the New Jersey litigant under New Jersey law as it would
hope another state would protect a California resident under California
222. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 40926.
223. See id. at 426–32.
224. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 15-7-120(A) (2018) (“Notwithstanding a provision
in a contract requiring a cause of action arising under it to be brought in a location
other than as provided in this title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
for a similar cause of action, the cause of action alternatively may be brought in
the manner provided in this title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
for such causes of action.”).
225. Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618
(N.J. 1996).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 622.
228. Id. at 618.
229. Id.
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law, if the case were referred elsewhere.”230 The court expressed
confidence that the California court “will fairly and impartially adjudicate
the dispute between the parties in accordance with the governing law,
which in this case might happen to be the law of New Jersey,”231 despite
the California choice-of-law clause.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.232 After an extensive
discussion of the legislative history and text of the New Jersey Franchise
Act and the policies it embodied, the court concluded that enforcement of
the FS clause “would substantially undermine the protections that the
Legislature intended to afford to all New Jersey franchisees.”233 The court
reasoned that a FS clause can “materially diminish the rights guaranteed by
the Franchise Act” by “mak[ing] litigation more costly and cumbersome for
economically weaker franchisees that often lack the sophistication and
resources to litigate effectively a long distance from home.”234 The court
expressed its concern—not only about the strong likelihood that the
California court would not apply the New Jersey Franchise Act but also
about “the denial of a franchisee’s right to obtain injunctive and other relief
from a New Jersey court.”235 For, “even if a California and a New Jersey
court afforded identical relief under the Act to an aggrieved franchisee, there
may be a difference of substantial magnitude in the practical accessibility of
that relief from the perspective of an unsophisticated and underfinanced
New Jersey franchisee.”236
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this Article was to describe what courts do on
this previously unexplored subject, rather than what they should do. As the
discussion in Part III indicates, however, this does not mean that the author
has no opinions on the matter. Rather it means that those opinions are just
that. For what it may be worth, the author agrees with the holding and
reasoning of the Petersen and Kubis & Perszyk courts and any other court
“seized” under similar circumstances that takes the same position. FS
clauses and choice-of-law clauses contribute to the smooth flow of
interstate and international commerce by providing contracting parties
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 620 (quoting the intermediate court).
Id.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
Id.
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with much needed certainty regarding the place of litigation and its likely
outcome. In cases involving parties with disproportionally unequal
bargaining power, however, a clever combination of FS and choice-of-law
clauses can deprive presumptively weak parties like consumers and
employees of any meaningful opportunity to assert their legitimate rights.
Other legal systems avoid this problem through the enactment of
legislation specifically addressing these cases. In the United States, some
states have also enacted similar statutes, but most states have not. In the
absence of such protective statutes, the task of protecting the
presumptively weak parties falls on the courts. One hopes that, in deciding
cases involving such parties, courts will be as vigilant as the Petersen and
Kubis & Perszyk courts in scrutinizing the potentially abusive combination
of FS clauses and choice-of-law clauses.

